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Abstract
We discuss four potential ways to reduce conflict between groups: consideration of future
consequences, independent leadership, outgroup empathy, and coordination. We review relevant
empirical findings for each method and discuss how each can be used to promote intergroup
cooperation.
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War and Peace: Possible Approaches to Reducing Intergroup Conflict
Intergroup conflict is one of the greatest problems facing the world today. War, genocide,
and terrorism are ever-present realities of modern life. It has been estimated that over 210 million
people were killed during the 20th century by governmental genocidal policies (Woolf &
Hulsizer, 2004) and that 170 million of these casualties were civilian deaths. It is perhaps even
more frightening that the number of people killed by terrorists each year is on the rise. Figure 1
presents a graph of the number of people throughout the world killed by terrorists from 1972 to
2006 (National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, 2007). As shown in the
figure, fewer than 2,500 people were killed by terrorists between 1992 and 1996. In comparison,
more than 8,000 people were killed between 1997 and 2001 and more than 30,000 people were
killed between 2002 and 2006. Clearly, the plague of intergroup violence requires a cure.
Although the task of reducing intergroup violence is daunting, social scientists are
making progress (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Kelman, 1997; Pettigrew, 1998). Research in
our laboratory has revealed four possible approaches to reducing conflict between groups:
consideration of future consequences, independent leadership, outgroup empathy, and
coordination. In this article, we provide an overview of our findings and discuss how these
techniques might be used to reduce conflict. All of the experimental results we report are
statistically significant (p < .05).
In these experiments, intergroup conflict was operationalized as intergroup behavior in
the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG; see Fig. 2). The PDG is a mixed-motive game in which
participants have the option of acting cooperatively (by choosing X) or competitively (by
choosing Y). Because interindividual interactions in the PDG are generally more cooperative
than intergroup interactions (a phenomenon known as the interindividual–intergroup
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discontinuity effect; Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, & Schopler, 2003), in most of these
studies, intergroup behavior was compared with interindividual behavior in the same game, with
outcomes (money) equated on a per individual basis. Manipulations that promote intergroup
cooperation relative to interindividual cooperation point to possible ways to reduce conflict that
uniquely relate to group processes.1
Obviously, experimental games cannot capture all of the complexities of specific
intergroup conflicts; however, using the PDG to study conflict allows researchers to identify the
unique contributions of different psychological processes. Despite the seeming simplicity of the
PDG, Axelrod pointed out that it could be used to model trench warfare in World War I, and a
survey by Halevy, Sagiv, Roccas, and Bornstein (2006) found that some Israeli Jews perceive the
Israeli–Palestinian conflict as a prisoner’s dilemma.
Consideration of Future Consequences
Expectation of Future Interactions
Axelrod (1984) has written about the importance of future interactions in promoting
cooperation in the PDG. Specifically, Axelrod argued that cooperation emerges in the PDG when
players realize that they might meet again in the future or, in other words, when the future has “a
sufficiently large shadow” (p. 174). Axelrod noted that cooperation emerged in the trench
warfare of World War I because small units faced each other for long periods of time. For
example, one soldier made the following observation:
It would be child’s play to shell the road behind the enemy’s trenches…but on the whole
there is silence. After all, if you prevent your enemy from drawing his rations, his remedy
is simple: he will prevent you from drawing yours (cited in Axelrod, 1984, p. 79).
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Axelrod’s trench warfare example suggests that intergroup cooperation can be induced
through the expectation of future interactions. In a relatively simple empirical demonstration of
this idea, Insko et al. (2001) showed that anticipation of future trials in the PDG can lead to
increases in intergroup cooperation. Participants were assigned randomly to one of two 3-person
groups and were informed that they would interact with the other group in the PDG either one
time or multiple times. All groups interacted only once. Insko et al. (2001) hypothesized that the
expectation of multiple interactions, as opposed to a single interaction, would shift groups from a
short-term to a long-term orientation and that this would increase cooperation. The results were
consistent with those predictions and showed that groups expecting a single trial cooperated 44%
of the time, whereas groups expecting multiple trials cooperated 72% of the time.
Turn Taking
In a separate investigation of the benefits of future consideration, Insko et al. (1998,
Study 2) compared successive responding (i.e., turn taking) to simultaneous responding in the
PDG. In the successive-responding condition, one group learned its opponent’s choice before
making its own choice on the first trial, and the other group learned this information before
choosing on the second trial. In the simultaneous-responding condition, both groups made their
choices at the same time. Insko et al. (1998) argued that turn taking would make it functional for
groups to think beyond the immediate situation and instead focus on the long-term consequences
of their behavior. For example, if on the first trial, the group choosing second decided to exploit
their opponent’s cooperation, the other group could do the same on the next trial. Ultimately, this
pattern might result in mutual non-cooperation for the remainder of the interactions. Insko et al.
(1998) predicted that participants in the turn-taking condition would recognize the potential costs
of mutual non-cooperation and therefore would be more likely to cooperate than would
War and Peace 6
participants in the simultaneous-responding condition.
The results were consistent with predictions; groups in the turn-taking condition
cooperated 76% of the time, whereas groups in the simultaneous responding condition
cooperated 45% of the time. This pattern held both for groups that initially chose first and for
groups that initially chose second. It is important to note that Insko et al. (1998) found that
groups in the successive-responding condition were more likely to expect reciprocity than were
groups in the simultaneous-responding condition. In fact, the second group invariably cooperated
if the first group cooperated. Insko et al. (1998) argued that thinking about the potential for
reciprocity in intergroup interactions shifts the focus of both groups from the immediate gains of
competition to the long-term benefits of cooperation. It seems, then, that knowing that opponents
who are exploited will have the opportunity for retaliation is a potential impetus for peace.
Tit For Tat
In a third experiment, Insko et al. (1998, Study 1) took an operationally different, but
conceptually similar, approach to future consideration by examining the effects of tit-for-tat
responding in the PDG. They posited that having participants face an opponent using a tit-for-tat
strategy would make groups aware of the long-term costs of reciprocal competition and,
accordingly, would result in increased cooperation. In the control condition, groups interacted in
the PDG for 15 trials. In the tit-for-tat condition, one group was composed of confederates who
cooperated on the first trial, but on subsequent trials they chose whatever the participants had
chosen on the previous trial. Insko et al. (1998) found that groups that faced a tit-for-tat opponent
cooperated 92% of the time, whereas groups in the control condition cooperated 72% of the time.
In support of the link between tit-for-tat responding and the consideration of future
consequences, mediational analyses suggested that the tit-for-tat manipulation caused
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participants to become more concerned with long-term outcomes and that this concern was
related to cooperation.
Consideration of Future Consequences and Peace in the Middle East
Results from these studies suggest that groups entrenched in conflict may be made to
cooperate if they are induced to think about the long-term consequences of their actions. The tit-
for-tat results suggest that one way to promote such thinking is to let the other side know that
peaceful, cooperative actions will be reciprocated, as will hostile, competitive actions. In August
of 2005, Ariel Sharon, the former Prime Minister of Israel, tried such a strategy. During a
unilateral Israeli pull-out of settlements in the Gaza Strip, Sharon informed the Palestinians of
Israel’s tit-for-tat intentions: “The world awaits the Palestinian response—a hand offered in
peace or continued terrorist fire. To a hand offered in peace, we will respond with an olive
branch. But if they choose to fire, we will respond with fire, more severe than ever” (Matza,
Nissenbaum, & Merzer, 2005, p. A8). Sharon’s statements coupled with the empirical findings of
Insko et al. (1998) suggest that one way to promote peace may be through tit-for-tat strategies.
Unfortunately however, Israel’s tit-for-tat intentions were not enough to establish peace:
At the time this paper was written, Israeli–Palestinian violence was on the rise, and the death toll
in this region of the world was the highest it had been in years. Why might Israel’s tit-for-tat
attempt have failed? Unfortunately, tit for tat does not guarantee consideration of long-term
consequences. Indeed, a major limitation of the tit-for-tat approach is that in the absence of
cooperation, hostility will be reciprocated. Such “eye-for-an-eye” responding can, of course,
leave everyone blind. Research by Van Lange and colleagues (Tazelaar, Van Lange, &
Ouwerkerk, 2004; Van Lange, Ouwerkerk, & Tazelaar, 2002) suggests that, at least for
individuals, forgiveness might prevent cycles of negative reciprocity. Specifically, they have
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found that apologies (Tazelaar et al., 2004) and generosity (Van Lange et al., 2002) can mitigate
the negative effects of misunderstandings or noise (i.e., discrepancies between intended and
actual outcomes). Another way to avoid cycles of negative reciprocity might be through trust.
Future Consideration and Trust
Although researchers have found it difficult to reach a consensus regarding the
appropriate definition of trust (cf., Cook, Hardin, & Levi, 2005; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994),
most would agree that trust, or lack thereof, is an important factor in intergroup conflict. In our
laboratory, we use the word trust to refer to the expectation that one’s opponent will behave
cooperatively (Insko, Kirchner, Pinter, Efaw, & Wildschut, 2005; Insko et al., 2001). Note that,
because cooperation may be rooted in factors other than goodwill and benign intent, some
theorists (e.g., Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994) would disagree that the expectation of
cooperation is a true indicator of trust. Although we acknowledge that the intentionality behind
cooperation may often be an important issue to consider, what is important for our purposes is
whether groups expect cooperation from their opponent, regardless of the assumed basis for
cooperation.
Insko et al. (2001) first explored the role of trust in intergroup conflict by testing whether
the anticipation of future interactions would lead to increased trust, as well as increased
cooperation. Insko et al. (2001) predicted that, because the anticipation of future interactions
makes the long-term benefits of cooperation salient, groups expecting multiple PDG trials would
be more likely to expect cooperation from their opponent than would groups expecting only a
single trial. The results were consistent with predictions; groups anticipating multiple trials
reported that the likelihood that their opponent would cooperate was 70%, whereas groups
anticipating a single trial reported a likelihood of 47%. The actual rates of cooperation were
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strikingly similar (72% and 44%, respectively).
Groups anticipating future interactions made relatively more cooperative and more
trusting choices than did groups not anticipating future interactions; however, there was still
significant competition in the multiple-trials condition. Some other factor must be present if
conflict is to be eliminated more completely. Insko et al. (2001) speculated that the missing
ingredient for peace was proneness to abstract thinking or, more specifically, proneness to
conceptualize the “shadowy” future consequences of multiple trials.
Trust and Abstract Thinking
Thinking about the future consequences of one’s actions requires more abstract thought
than does thinking about immediate outcomes. It is important to look at abstract thinking and
trust together because there are often short-term benefits but long-term costs of exploiting
another group’s trust. Therefore, if it is to be maximally effective at promoting cooperation, trust
must be coupled with an ability to think abstractly about the future.
To test this idea, Insko et al. (2001) included assessments of trust and abstract thinking,
along with the trial manipulation, in a model predicting intergroup competition. The results were
consistent with predictions: Insko et al. (2001) found that competition was practically eliminated
when multiple trials were anticipated and groups were composed of abstract thinkers who trusted
their opponents. When multiple trials were anticipated, groups with high trust and high
abstractness cooperated 93% of the time. Cooperation dropped to 74% when trust was high but
abstract thinking was low, and it dropped to 10% when abstract thinking was high but trust was
low. Clearly, the optimal combination for reductions in intergroup conflict is for groups to
anticipate future interactions, to trust their opponent, and to think abstractly. Anticipating future
interactions may promote cooperation on its own but trust and abstract thinking must also be
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present for conflict to be more completely eliminated.
A Possible Role for Ideology in Extending the Time Required for Recognition of Long-Term
Consequences
Overall, the studies cited above suggest that intergroup conflict may be reduced if groups
are induced to think about the long-term consequences of their actions. Although certain
personality traits, such as abstract thinking, may predispose groups to behave cooperatively,
dispositional traits are often less malleable than is situational structure. One might thus find it
promising that situational factors, such as turn taking and tit-for-tat responding, can induce
groups to develop a long-term perspective and forgo conflict for cooperation. However, as
illustrated by the Thirty Years War in Germany, the “Troubles” in Northern Ireland, and the
Israeli–Palestinian conflict, some instances of tit-for-tat like responding may go on for many
years before combatants realize the futility of such behavior. Unfortunately, it may take quite a
while before the more radical group members begin to consider the negative future consequences
of their behavior.2
Why does it sometimes require a considerable passage of time before groups realize the
futility of continued conflict? We do not know, but the fact that the above examples all involve
conflict between religious groups suggests the interesting possibility that group-related ideology
may play a role.3 Although we have yet to explore this issue, research by Jost on systems
justification theory (e.g., Jost & Hunyady, 2005) and by Pratto and Sidanius on social dominance
theory (e.g., Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006) suggest that ideology may have a strong influence
on intergroup behavior.
Independent Leadership
Can strong leaders make peace? Research by Pinter and colleagues (2007) suggests that
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they can. Leaders often act so as to benefit their ingroup, which unfortunately often puts them at
odds with outgroups. In general, groups advocate and engage in more contentious behavior than
do individuals, which undoubtedly poses problems for leaders who are trying to find middle
ground. Perhaps the most difficult task for any leader is to satisfy his or her constituents while
still brokering reasonable agreements with outgroups. In light of the relative peacefulness of
interindividual interactions, Pinter et al. designed a study to investigate ways to make group
leaders act more like individuals (i.e., cooperatively).
Specifically, Pinter et al. (2007) compared the behavior of group leaders with that of
individuals in the PDG. Group leaders were appointed (i.e., randomly selected) by the
experimenter.4 In addition, Pinter et al. examined two factors that they suspected would affect
leaders’ behavior: leader accountability and guilt proneness. Accountable leaders were informed
that ingroup members would be aware of the leader’s influence on the groups’ outcomes, and
unaccountable leaders were informed that ingroup members would not be aware of the leader’s
influence. Guilt proneness was measured at the beginning of each experimental session.
Pinter et al. looked at guilt proneness because of the postulated role of guilt as a moral
emotion (Tangney, 2003). Guilt proneness tends to cause individuals to act in line with moral
norms. Moral norms in interindividual contexts generally require fairness and cooperativeness.
Wildschut and Insko (2006) labeled this set of norms individual morality. In intergroup contexts,
however, being moral generally means doing what is best for one’s ingroup. Wildschut and Insko
(2006) labeled this set of norms group morality. Whereas individual morality prescribes
cooperation in the PDG, group morality prescribes competition because, in the PDG, maximizing
ingroup outcomes necessarily entails minimizing outgroup outcomes (Cohen, Montoya, & Insko,
2006; Wildschut & Insko, 2006). The goal of the Pinter et al. study was to induce leaders to act
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in line with the codes of individual morality rather than those of group morality. They
hypothesized that accountable leaders would face strong normative pressure to favor the ingroup,
and thus would be induced to follow the codes of group morality and act competitively. On the
other hand, they hypothesized that, because they would face considerably less normative
pressure to favor the ingroup, unaccountable leaders would be free to follow the codes of
individual morality and act cooperatively. Because of the association between guilt proneness
and morality, Pinter et al. expected differences due to accountability to emerge primarily for
high-guilt leaders.
Consistent with predictions, accountable high-guilt leaders cooperated only 63% of the
time, whereas unaccountable high-guilt leaders cooperated 98% of the time. These findings
suggest that high-guilt leaders who are given some degree of independence or unaccountability
in their decision making will be better able to foster peace than will leaders who are relatively
less independent. Leaders with strong moral convictions may be able to bring about peace, but
only if they are able to push the pressures of group morality aside and instead act within the
dictates of individual morality.
On September 24, 1995, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian Authority
Chairman Yasir Arafat signed the Oslo 2 Accord, which represented a major step forward in
Israeli–Palestinian peace efforts (Smith, 2006). How were Rabin and Arafat able to come to such
an agreement? One interpretation is that they acted independently from their more extreme bases
and thus were able behave more like individuals (i.e., cooperatively). Unfortunately, such
independent leadership had heavy costs. Both leaders lost vital support from their own sides for
attempting to negotiate a peace agreement, and for Rabin, this resulted in his murder. On
November 4, 1995, Rabin was killed by an Orthodox Jew who believed Rabin's negotiations
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with Arafat were the mark of a traitor (Smith, 2006). Rabin’s assassination underscores the
difficulties associated with independent leadership—it may be able to bring about peace, but
leaders who act independently may not stay leaders for long (see Haslam & Platow, 2001, for
empirical support of this idea).
Outgroup Empathy
Research in our lab has revealed a third process for promoting cooperation between
groups: outgroup empathy. By outgroup empathy, we mean feelings of concern directed at an
outgroup. The assumption underlying this line of research is that empathizing with an outgroup
can lead to cooperative intergroup behavior. There is a substantial body of research highlighting
the effectiveness of empathy in reducing both interindividual aggression (Miller & Eisenberg,
1988) and prejudice (Stephan & Finlay, 1999). Furthermore, there is a growing body of research
suggesting that empathy can be helpful in reducing antipathy toward outgroups (Malhotra &
Liyanage, 2005; Schechtman & Basheer, 2005). For example, Shechtman and Basheer found that
the more empathy Arab children felt toward Jewish children, the less likely they were to support
aggression toward Jewish children. Malhotra and Liyanage found that Tamil and Sinhalese high-
school students living in Sri Lanka who had participated in a 4-day peace workshop in 2001 were
more likely in 2002 to report empathic feelings toward the outgroup and donate money to an
outgroup charity than were those Tamil and Sinhalese students who had not participated in the
peace workshop. Malhotra and Liyanage’s findings are particularly striking, as the hostility
between the Tamils (a Hindu group) and the Sinhalese (a Buddhist group) has plagued Sri Lanka
with civil warfare for over 20 years.
Pettigrew (1998) suggested that the effectiveness of intergroup contact in improving
intergroup relations may stem in part from outgroup empathy or outgroup perspective taking.
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Malhotra and Liyanage’s (2005) findings support this idea, as do findings by Hewstone, Cairns,
Voci, Hamberger, & Niens (2006). Hewstone et al. found that intergroup contact between
Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland was positively related to outgroup perspective
taking, attitudes, trust, and forgiveness.
We conducted an experiment testing whether outgroup empathy can promote intergroup
cooperation (Cohen & Insko, 2008). In the experiment, participants were assigned randomly to
one of two 3-person groups and interacted for one trial by making choices on a PDG-Alt matrix
(a prisoner’s dilemma plus a third withdrawal choice yielding intermediate outcomes regardless
of the opponent’s choice). Participants were randomly assigned to complete one of three writing
exercises (outgroup empathy, ingroup empathy, or objective perspective) prior to making their
choices in the PDG-Alt matrix. Those in the outgroup-empathy condition were asked to imagine
how the members of the other group felt about the upcoming interaction in the prisoner’s
dilemma matrix (e.g., how they would likely feel when they learned each group’s decision).
Participants in the ingroup-empathy condition were asked to imagine how the members of their
own group felt about the upcoming interaction. Participants in the objective-perspective
condition were asked to think about the upcoming interaction but remain objective and detached.
We predicted that participants in the outgroup-empathy condition would act more
cooperatively and that participants in the ingroup-empathy condition would act less
cooperatively than would those in the objective-perspective condition. Our results (see Figure 3)
were consistent with these predictions, although further analyses revealed that the increase in
cooperation among those in the outgroup-empathy condition occurred primarily for group
members who were low in dispositional empathy, and the decrease in cooperation among those
in the ingroup-empathy condition occurred primarily for group members who were high in guilt
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proneness.
An intriguing promise of outgroup empathy is that it may be helpful in overcoming
group-related ideological differences that are frequently associated with prolonged conflict. Note
that the conflicts between the Jews and Muslims in Palestine (Schechtman & Basheer, 2005), the
Buddhists and Hindus in Sri Lanka (Malhotra & Liyanage, 2005), and the Protestants and
Catholics in Northern Ireland (Hewstone et al., 2006) are all associated with religious-ideological
differences. It is thus encouraging that research has supported the idea that intergroup contact
and outgroup empathy can promote positive intergroup relations among groups with deep-rooted
histories of conflict.
Coordination & Superordinate Goals
Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif (1961) conducted a classic demonstration of the
effectiveness of superordinate goals in reducing intergroup conflict. They presented evidence
that hostility between two groups of boys at a summer camp was reduced when the boys were
faced with achieving shared or superordinate goals (e.g., pooling money so as to rent a favorite
movie; locating a problem with the camp’s water system).
Why do superordinate goals promote cooperation? One possibility is that superordinate
goals create situations in which outcomes can be maximized through coordination. Coordination
situations can be represented as matrices with interaction terms (e.g., Leader, Battle of the Sexes;
Kelley & Thibaut, 1978) in which, unlike the PDG, each side can maximize their own outcomes
though cooperation instead of competition. Wolf, Insko, Kirchner, and Wildschut (in press)
found that groups were more cooperative in coordination situations than in exchange situations
(e.g., PDG) and that the difference was mediated by the tendency for individuals to perceive both
groups as one common group. Wolf et al.’s findings support Gaertner and Dovidio’s (2000)
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Common Ingroup Identity Model, which proposes that intergroup bias may be reduced by the
promotion of the perception of one common group. Gaertner and Dovidio’s model suggests that
intergroup cooperation might be increased by making group members understand that they are
all equally members of the human race. This Jeffersonian idea can be traced back to John Locke
(1690/1997) and has been developed at some length by the philosopher Peter Singer (1981) in
his book The Expanding Circle.
Conclusion and a Question for Future Research
In this article, we discussed four possible approaches to reducing conflict between
groups: consideration of future consequences, independent leadership, outgroup empathy, and
coordination. Although these findings should be regarded as preliminary and only suggestive, we
believe that they provide a basis for optimism about a very difficult and obviously important
problem.
There are many issues that could and should be addressed by future research, but one
important question to consider is how various approaches to conflict reduction might be
implemented. How might psychological processes that reduce intergroup conflict play out in
protracted conflicts throughout the world? Psychologists are making progress in answering this
question (e.g., Kelman, 1997; Hewstone et al., 2006), and we hope this trend continues.
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Notes
1The PDG is a symmetric matrix in which the opponents have equal power to influence each
other's outcomes. Although our pilot testing has not revealed reliable differences between
matrices with equal power and those without, we acknowledge that there probably are
circumstances in which such differences occur.
2Nash’s concept of an equilibrium point (a situation or cell form that neither party can
unilaterally leave without reducing outcomes) implies that mutual competition should
continue indefinitely. The PDG was, in fact, developed by two mathematicians at RAND
Corporation, Merrill Flood and Melvin Drescher, specifically for the purpose of testing
the equilibrium-point prediction (Poundstone, 1992). Although research has generally
failed to support Nash’s game-theory prediction, we acknowledge that such behavior
does clearly occur in some situations and that, as speculated above, it may be particularly
likely in conflicts between differing ideologies.
3We do not mean to imply that the ideology associated with extended conflicts need be religious.
Note the Marxist guerilla campaigns of Che Guevara and others.
4Although many leaders are appointed, such as executive officers in various business
organizations, we acknowledge that democratically elected leaders might introduce
additional complexities.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Deaths due to terrorism throughout the world from 1972 to 2006.
Figure 2. A prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) matrix. This matrix represents a social interaction
involving two groups (a bolded group and an outlined group). Each group has two
choices, X and Y. The values represent the amount of money (in U.S. cents) that each side
receives as a function of the two groups’ choices.
Figure 3. Results for empathy study (N = 356).
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